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# Rethinking Return

LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA, LIBERIA AND NIGERIA



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*IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria  
Photo By: Luke Strathmann*

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# Executive Summary

At the end of 2017 an estimated 68.5 million forcibly displaced people (FDPs) had been driven from their homes across the world, including 25.4 million refugees and over 40 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). This report examines the challenges of implementing programs and policies in post-conflict settings and the factors that contribute to whether and how FDPs return. The report draws on student-led research trips to Colombia, Liberia and Nigeria, and highlights differences in the duration, nature, and stage of conflict, as well as levels of state capacity.

Government responses to FDP crises depend on pre-existing institutional structures, which often determine if the government's coordination will be fully centralized or delegated to sub-national authorities. This also influences the degree of involvement by the international community and other actors. Throughout this report, we consider how variation in institutional arrangements lead to different policy responses, beginning with Nigeria as a case of de-centralized response, moving on to Colombia as a mixed approach, and ending with Liberia as an example of centralized response

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*With the degree of centralization and the institutional frameworks as a backdrop, we highlight implications for programming strategy by international actors and potential tensions of adopting certain response approaches. Some of these include:*

- The institutionalization of resource-sharing structures between returnees and other community members to limit tensions due to preferential access to resources.
- Given the inevitable long tail of return, investing in local institutions to support sustainable programming.
- Providing more accurate and timely information, as well as more opportunities to facilitate informal communication channels or return decisions.
- Setting and clearly communicating realistic programming timelines to ensure that FDPs' expectations will be met.
- Formal inclusion of FDPs in the decision-making structure to improve the programmatic response to displacement.

As part of IOM's work to expand its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) tool in northeast Nigeria, our final section focuses on return indicators and data that would enable differentiation between a return that is durable and a return that is just another displacement in a new location. Appendix I proposes a new framework and set of indicators to build on IOM's DTM in order to understand:

- How people are returning, and where people have moved to;
- How to ensure that where people return amounts to a durable solution; and
- Which indicators are most strongly linked to people staying? i.e., what are the indicators that are most correlated with durable returns?

These indicators are linked to the eight durable solutions criteria in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, and are used to construct a weighted index that can help IOM and its partners prioritize funding and programming.

# Introduction

At the end of 2017, there were an estimated 68.5 million forcibly displaced persons (FDPs) worldwide, including 25.4 million refugees and over 40 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (UNHCR 2017).<sup>1</sup> These figures include nearly 12 million displaced people due to conflict and violence in 2017 alone (IDMC 2018), and are expected to grow.

This report is a product of a policy workshop course taken by students in the Master in Public Affairs (MPA) program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs at Princeton University, and addresses a set of programming questions presented by our clients – Mercy Corps and the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Our primary focus is on the challenges of implementing return programs in early post-conflict settings that threaten achieving durable solutions in the long term.

Moreover, this report examines the most important considerations for FDPs when deciding whether and how to return, and how to ascertain whether a return is durable. Our work should not be seen as endorsement of one particular type of durable solution, but rather an acknowledgment of the need to address many diverse issues for those who are returning. In this context, IOM asked us to focus on interpreting the data available for villages to which people are returning in northeast Nigeria to understand if returnees will find conditions supporting positive long-term outcomes (safety, livelihoods, community, etc.). Mercy Corps asked us to speak more specifically to issues of community cohesion after FDP return.

## Methodology

In addition to a literature review, this report draws heavily from week-long research trips to Colombia, Liberia, and Nigeria.<sup>2</sup> These countries were selected for their differences in the duration, nature, and stage of conflict, as well as geographic size and existing state capacity. Governments, multi-lateral agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local civil society organizations (CSOs) have each devoted significant resources, but to varying degrees, to the FDP crises in these countries.

While this report focuses predominantly on three case studies, the findings of this research have wider ramifications. We have structured our findings and recommendations to highlight commonalities across countries and desk research. Please see Appendix II for additional information on our research methodology, processes, and timeline.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this report, we use Forcibly Displaced Persons (FDP) to refer to refugees and IDPs together. When the text refers to only one group, we use refugees or IDPs, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Between October 25 and November 3, 2018, three students traveled to Colombia, three to Liberia, and four traveled to Nigeria to conduct key informant interviews with FDPs, government entities, international organizations, and NGOs.

# Organization of Report and Framing of Lessons and Recommendations

This report presents our research in three broad dimensions

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## *Section 2.1: Institutional framework and capacities for the implementation of return efforts*

In addition to a strong policy frameworks and coordination at the international level, the success of FDP return programs relies in large part on implementation. Our recommendations focus on understanding the institutional dynamics that lead to successful implementation and programming.

## *Section 2.2: The relationship with communities affected by the implementation of return efforts*

Policies and programming can be well-intentioned, well-designed, and have a robust institutional framework, yet face setbacks when involving the affected communities in the design and implementation. Also, tensions within and between different communities (returnees and host communities, for example) can be a major obstacle for successful implementation of return programming and policies.

## *Section 3: The importance of data collection and need for a more informed decision-making in FDP return efforts*

This section specifically relates to IOM's objective to develop a methodology for expansion of its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) tool in northeast Nigeria to focus on areas of return. It provides a set of recommendations on adjustments and additions to the current indicator pool with a focus on feasibility given the resources and constraints available in Nigeria.

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While each of these sections draws lessons and makes recommendations, we do not aim to provide tailored solutions to each of these problems. In some cases, our findings allow government, NGO and other practitioners to make specific programming recommendations, while in other instances we present them as general findings to be considered by those in charge of programming or advocacy efforts. We recognize that obstacles in programming implementation are often the result of tension between competing goals and often do not stem from policymakers' lack of awareness.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the report, we point out when we have been able to identify the competing goals or factors that lead to the emergence of the obstacles.

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<sup>3</sup>For example, expectations for FDP programming offer an illustrative example. On the one hand there is the goal to garner support for a given policy, for which the promised (and stated) benefits of the policy at hand need to be attractive enough. However, big promises at the time of the policy's adoption can become a problem at the time of implementation. The high expectations then quickly turn into frustration. The conundrum is that without the initial promises, the policy for FDP assistance might not be approved in the first place, leaving the FDP population in a worse situation.



# 1 Guiding Frameworks

The causes of displacement are commonly analyzed in terms of the "push-pull model" (IOM, 2015). We extend this framework to study reintegration after return from displacement and look at factors that coerce FDPs to leave their host community (push), as well as factors that induce them to return to their place of origin voluntarily (pull). While there are many instances in which FDPs return despite the absence of these factors, this framework highlights elements that influence FDPs' return decisions and could be addressed with programming or policy efforts.

## Push Factors

Long-term settlement of FDPs requires extensive financial commitments and may leave host countries (in the case of refugees) or communities (in the case of IDPs) vulnerable to shifting priorities or funding. Host governments and communities face a variety of resource and logistical challenges, and may resort to detentions, deportations, evictions, residency restrictions, and other coercive moves to push FDPs back to their home countries regardless of the security situation (Marks, 2018). Some host governments have encouraged asylum seekers to return by providing cash grants, raising ethical questions related to information provision, the security situation in the place of return, or the irreversibility of the return decision (Gerver, 2017). Beyond these institutional factors, FDPs often face a variety of community and individual-level challenges: limited economic opportunity or rights to work, non-transferrable skills in the location of displacement, social exclusion or discrimination, and inadequate services.

## Pull Factors

Security in the place of origin (and perception thereof) is a primary driver of the decision by FDPs to return. While security risks (e.g.,

ongoing violence) may be the main obstacle to returns, many trust and information issues remain. If FDPs do not trust the security services, or if the security forces in the places of origin contributed to the process of displacement, FDPs may be much less likely to return to their communities. Moreover, accurate and timely information about security conditions in home communities is crucial to FDPs reaching their own conclusions about the risks of return. Several studies highlight security as one of the primary topics on which FDPs want information, and stress the risk of false or inaccurate information about security conditions in the communities of origin (REACH, 2017; Refugees International, 2018). In addition to security concerns, conditions that support livelihoods and/or social well-being are often crucial to FDP return decisions. These factors include: access to justice, the right of return to areas of origin, economic opportunity, adequate housing, desire for social or cultural familiarity, and peace processes that take FDP voices into account (e.g., through voting in local elections in the place of displacement).

## Durable Solutions

Push and pull factors, or the lack thereof, while usually used to understand the shorter-term movements of displacement, also begin to provide a framework for how to conceptualize long-term durable solutions for FDPs. The UN has worked to concretize the durable solution concept for IDPs and also to provide guidance on achieving it. The result is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC)<sup>4</sup> Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. According to this framework, a durable solution is achieved when "IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement" (Brookings, 2010).

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<sup>4</sup> The IASC is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance.

This framework includes the following eight criteria to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved:



**Safety and Security**



**Adequate Standard of Living**



**Access to Livelihoods**



**Restoration of Housing, Land and Property**



**Access to Documentation**



**Family Reunification**



**Participation in Public Affairs**



**Access to Effective Remedies And Justice**

While these eight evaluation criteria were developed for durable solutions for IDPs specifically, they were later extended to refugees (UNHRC 2016). This framework also asserts that durable FDP returns should be voluntary, reversible, informed, respectful, and fall into three major types:

- Sustainable reintegration in the place of origin (hereinafter referred to as “return”);
- Sustainable local integration in areas where FDP initially took refuge (local integration); or
- Sustainable integration in another country or part of their home country different than initial site of resettlement (settlement elsewhere).

That is, durable solutions must not be exclusively understood as a return to one’s former home and/or re-establishment of the pre-displacement status quo

Displaced people can, and more often do, find durable solutions away from their former home if their displacement-specific needs are met and they can enjoy rights without displacement-specific discrimination. Conversely, many former refugees and displaced people who have achieved durable solutions may still face development and human rights challenges.

While this report focuses on return, this should not be understood as a preference for this particular outcome over the two other ones. We acknowledge that return per se might not be the most feasible or desirable of the three possible outcomes in a number of contexts. Throughout this report, we seek to understand the nuances and pitfalls of durable returns for FDPs and the implications this has for those designing programmatic and policy responses.

# 2

# Context Matters

## **Institutions, community, and the implementation of programs for displaced populations**

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The implementation of FDP policies and programming occur within existing institutional frameworks, and this section investigates the challenges related to two major dimensions:

1. The Institutional Framework for Programs Implementation for FDP Response
  2. The Relationship with Communities and Civil Society
- 

The Colombia and Liberia case studies allow us to consider cases where programs were implemented at least a decade ago, whereas Nigeria provides an example of currently ongoing substantial FDP programming.

The aims of this section are two-fold. First, we provide insights to programming decisions made by international actors in their interactions with national governments and communities through the analysis of the bottlenecks found in our respective case studies. Second, we provide material for the advocacy efforts undertaken by INGOs vis-à-vis national governments' strategies for FDP response.



*Dalori II, IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria  
Photo By: Luke Strathmann*

## 2.1 Institutional Framework for Programs Implementation for FDP Response

### 2.1.1 Relevance and Conceptual Framework

Our analysis of the institutional framework includes the formal “rules of the process” – i.e. who makes decisions about resources and programming, and who sets strategic direction – as well as broader informal arrangements or practices. The institutional framework is the playing field in which the FDP programming is implemented, and we conceive it as the “relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to [...] changing external circumstances” (March & Olsen 2006, p. 3).

Although national governments have the primary responsibility for FDP protection and assistance, response efforts often involve a variety of local and international organizations. The actions and strategies of these organizations should be informed by the context in which they operate, and through a thorough understanding of programming questions such as:

- What players and organizations are best suited as implementation partners? Should the program engage more with national or sub-national authorities, and how?
- What are the main challenges that FDP programming will face in each institutional setting?
- How should programming be articulated with the response efforts provided by the country’s government at the national and sub-national level? In which geographic and thematic areas is the national government better suited to respond?

### 2.1.2 Institutional Arrangements for FDP Response: Governments’ Response and the role of the International Community

Government responses to FDP crises depend on the nature and length of the crisis, the government’s pre-existing institutional structures, and the financial and human resources available. These factors often determine if the government’s coordination will be fully centralized or delegated to sub-national authorities, as well as the degree of involvement by the international community and other actors.

The case studies in this report fall along a continuum of different degrees of government centralization. A completely centralized response by a government is one in which the entirety of the design and implementation of a policy falls within the purview of the national government. In this approach, the subnational units of government are mere spectators. On the other hand, in a completely de-centralized approach, policy design and implementation – including the responsibility to procure the funds – falls completely in the hands of the sub-national units of government (e.g. states, departments, municipalities).

Below we map how variation in institutional arrangements lead to different policy responses, beginning with Nigeria as a case of de-centralized response, moving on to Colombia as a mixed approach, and ending with Liberia as an example of centralized response. We also document a number of differences in terms of involvement of the international community. Through our three case studies, we offer findings and implications for future policy and programming decisions.

## Decentralized Approach: The Nigerian case

Nigeria's decentralized approach carries both advantages and disadvantages. Federal agencies such as the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs; the Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI); and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) provide guidelines and funding, and they define broad strategies. These national-level agencies are not in charge of direct program or policy implementation. Instead, implementation is done through state-level institutions such as the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the pertinent ministries at the state level (education, health, housing and sanitation, among others). In the specific case of Borno State in northeastern Nigeria, where our field work was conducted, a specialized ministry was founded to coordinate efforts at the state-level: the Ministry for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR).

Separation of implementation has created important disconnects in communication between the federal and local government actors because the federal government is removed from the implementation context. As Virginie Roiron points out, "There is no functional coordination mechanism between the state and federal level in a country where states enjoy a very high degree of autonomy" (Roiron 2017, 13).

While on the face of it, decentralization would allow a more tailored response by giving authority to local actors to make decisions, it does not seem to have made the policy response more tailored to community needs. Several interviewees from international community organizations working in Maiduguri pointed out that the federal government and the Borno State seem to be driven by political priorities rather than FDPs' best interest. Many cited that the decentralized approach exacerbates coordination problems, while not increasing local buy-in or resulting in a response specifically tailored to the differentiated needs of FDP in each of the sub-national units.



Focus Group, Dalori II, IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria  
Photo By: Luke Strathmann

One consistent finding in our interviews is that both levels of government appear to sideline the role of traditional leaders at the community level. The reasons for this are much broader than FDP integration, and incorporating traditional leaders would position displacement into a complex set of political issues in Nigeria. Nonetheless, given the importance of effective crisis response, we see sidelining traditional leaders, who seem to enjoy high levels of legitimacy, as a missed opportunity (See Box 1). The current arrangement without their formal role suggests a low level of community buy-in and involvement in the design and implementation of government FDP programming, which is something that was highlighted during focus group sessions with FDP in the two IDP camps that we visited in Maiduguri.

## Box 1: The crucial role of traditional leaders in Nigeria

Officials from UN agencies and INGOs in Maiduguri spoke about the crucial role traditional leaders play in efforts to move towards rule of law and improved security in areas of return. Nigerian staff working for INGOs emphasized the need to engage with traditional leaders across all stages of the return process.

A traditional leader can be defined as “the traditional head of an ethnic group or clan who is the holder of the highest primary executive authority in an indigenous polity, or who has been appointed to the position in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area concerned by instrument or order of the state government, and whose title is recognized as a traditional ruler title by the Government of the State” (Ola & Tonwe 2009, p. 174).

Since 1966, and throughout the 1970s, the Nigerian state engaged in a process that sought to reassert state authority and strip traditional leaders of their previous authority (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013; Chizea & Osumah 2015). Due to the insufficient provision of government services, particularly security, in many rural areas over the following decades, removing authority from the traditional leaders left a significant vacuum, which was then exploited by Boko Haram.

The INGO staff shared their belief that the government could and should do much more to both empower and engage with traditional leaders, and to take advantage of their influence in communities (Personal Interview, November 2018, Nigeria). However, Boko Haram continues to actively target traditional leaders in order to undermine local governance, meaning that safe return to their home communities is challenging.

## Mixed Approach: The Colombian case

While, like in Nigeria, the government of Colombia leads the planning of the FDP response plan, it is also involved in direct implementation of FDP programming related to economic reparations, land restitutions, and some humanitarian aid provision. However, in other areas, the implementation responsibility falls to the departmental and municipal governments. INGOs and civil society actors take supplementary roles.

In 2011, the Colombian government passed the Victim's and Land Restitution Law, or Law 1448. It is the main legal document that outlines rights and restitutions for victims of the conflict in Colombia (Republic of Colombia 2011). The Victim's Law formulated the policy for return and reparations of victims of the Colombian armed conflict through the establishment of the Unit for Victims Assistance and Reparation, known as the Victim's Unit (VU). The VU is a national entity that plays two main roles: coordination of national and subnational institutions on policy for victims of the conflict; and a large portion of direct implementation of programming (Unidad para las Víctimas 2018). The Victims Unit coordinates the response of more than 30 national level government institutions, as well as with all of the sub-national government units, that form part of the National System for Attention and Reparation to Victims (SNARIV).

Within this mixed model, coordination and joint work between the national government, and departmental and municipal governments is crucial for success. However, in practice, fragmented communication and irregular resource allocation between the central and municipal governments disrupts coordination and implementation. When asked about the relationship between the offices of the Victim's Unit at the municipal and national level, one municipal-level official from the Victim's Unit responded that there was very little communication between them (Personal Interview, October 2018, Colombia).

Moreover, much of the displacement has been focused on large or medium cities relatively close to the areas of conflict. Local governments in such cities are mandated to provide basic services and aid to the influx of FDPs and often struggle to do so. In some cases, this results in the local governments applying push tactics to incentivize or coerce FDPs to return to their areas of origin. For example, Ministry of Health officials in Colombia provided anecdotes of instances where municipalities and cities that received high numbers of IDPs had incentives to push them to return as a means of eliminating or reducing large expenses in their budgets (Personal Interview with Officials of the Ministry of Health of Colombia, October 26th 2018, Colombia).

Decentralization approaches in Colombia have resulted in mixed outcomes. While they have succeeded in providing more autonomy to sub-national units (namely municipalities), they have also resulted in a process of state capture and cooptation by local elites, often tied with armed groups or organized crime (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2010; Garay 2010; Gonzalez 2010; Revelo-Rebolledo & García-Villegas 2018). These trends tend to be more salient in municipalities where state presence is weaker and armed conflict is more severe.

As a result, the legitimacy of state authorities is scarce in many regions. Interviews in Colombia revealed that coordination and service delivery failures led to distrust within communities. In some cases, government actors were thought of as negligent or outright perpetrators of violence. When these same government entities were subsequently responsible for post-conflict reintegration efforts, community mistrust of institutions hindered return and reintegration. In contrast, the Colombian case also exhibits high levels of civil society and activist involvement, both before and after the enactment of the Victims' Law in 2011. The strength of victims and FDP social movements in Colombia is a notable feature that has contributed to the relative success in the implementation of FDP programming.

[Pita, Land of Peace], Colombia  
Photo By: Paloma Bellatin



## Box 2: FDP inclusion in Decision-making: the Colombian experience

Colombia has both formal and informal inclusion of FDPs in decision-making. Before the enactment of the Victims' Law in 2011 there was an important but informal process of organizing and coalition-building among IDP communities and leaders who became more active in demanding better articulated policies. The achievements of this movement during this first years include litigation in 2005 that resulted in a ruling where the Constitutional Court ordered the government to develop a serious and comprehensive policy for IDPs in the country. Moreover, the victims' movement played a key role in the lobbying for the approval of the Victims' Law in 2011 - an initiative that had already been rejected twice before.

Subsequently, in a nationally sanctioned approach, the 1448 Law created formal participatory spaces for victims' organizations. This law stipulates the need for effective participation of victims in the design, planning and implementation phases, and tasks the national, regional and local governments with ensuring effective participation of victims in the implementation of the law. Specifically, the state is obligated to provide victims with the means to choose their own representatives to engage in dialogue with the government at the municipal, state and national levels. (Instituto Latinoamericano, 2015). To facilitate this dialogue, two key participatory bodies were created by the law:

1. Victims participatory groups ("mesas"); and
2. Territorial Committees of Transitional Justice.

Victims elect representatives for the mesas at all three governance levels, and then these mesas elect representatives to the Territorial Committees of Transitional Justice. The mesas are an internal participatory space for victims' movements, while the Territorial Committees are a space where the representatives from the mesas interact with the different levels of government. However, challenges remain as state institutions often fail to support these bodies in practice.



## Centralized Approach: The Liberian case

In Liberia, coordination of FDP response was highly centralized. The Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) was meant to be the central coordinator on the side of the Liberian state. It is a national-level institution that worked closely with UNHCR and IOM. The LRRRC's expansive mandate included formulating FDP policies, facilitating communication to refugee communities, mobilizing resources, and developing programs.

In this respect, the Liberian government response minimized potential coordination problems across the different levels of government. However, the LRRRC lacked the financial and organizational capacity to effectively execute its functions at the local level and relied extensively on INGOs and International Organizations such as UNHCR and IOM for support to implement most of its activities.

With UNHCR and IOM playing a large resource and staffing role in the response, several coordination issues arose between the LRRRC and the international actors. Their work was fragmented, there were few guidelines for implementation, no mechanism to enforce adherence to planning objectives, and there was a disproportionate focus on a few counties and program interventions. Furthermore, when UNHCR and IOM began to draw down programming in 2008 and 2009, LRRRC did not have sufficient capacity or budget to take up the implementing role. While UNHCR and IOM filled the immediate resource gap during their time in-country, and even though interviews referred to the existence of some training sessions, they failed to foster the capacity of the local actor, LRRRC, to carry out its mandate. The fact that no effective efforts were undertaken to transfer capacities from the international players has had serious implications for Liberia's institutional capacity and the sustainability of FDP programming.

Civil society also played a role, both in terms of advocacy as well as implementing programs. The most prominent advocacy organization is the Liberian Returnee Network (LRN). The LRN was formed by returned refugees who felt the government and its partners' response did not meet the needs of refugees. The LRN has been a strong advocate for better programming, more generous return packages, and more holistic policies for reintegration. In addition to its advocacy role, LRN runs a vocational training program to provide basic skills for income generation. When LRN was founded in 2012, vocational training programs were only open to returned refugees. However, based on needs from the general community in Monrovia, LRN opened up its programming to all those who were interested.



Poster of the Liberia Returnee Network, Monrovia, Liberia  
Photo By: Matej Jungwirth

## Summary Table: Institutional Frameworks for FDP Response

Country	Centralization	Main Coordinating Bodies at National Level	Role of National Government	Role of International Community
<b>Nigeria</b>	Decentralized	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI)</li> <li>2. National Emergency Management Agency - NEMA</li> <li>3. National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs</li> </ol>	Support state-level governments in implementation of the programming	Key role in programming implementation. Working with the Nigerian institutions, but with a heavy direct implementation role.
<b>Colombia</b>	Mixed Approach	<p>Main Coordinating Institution: Victims Unit.</p> <p>National level response corresponds to the institutions that form the National System for Attention and Reparation to Victims (SNARIV) coordinated by the Victims Unit.</p> <p>The SNARIV is composed of 30 institutions of the executive branch at the national level of government.</p>	<p>Coordinate response between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Level institutions</li> <li>National and sub-national levels</li> <li>NGOs and the private sector</li> <li>Victims Organizations</li> </ul> <p>Establish the policy for the attention and reparation of victims</p> <p>Directly implement some of the policies (most notably, economic reparations and land restitutions)</p>	Support implementation of government policy and programs. Minor role in direct implementation.
<b>Liberia</b>	Centralized	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC)</li> </ol>	A coordinator of the response, but weak capacity and lack of resources, especially financial, necessitated outsourcing to local and international organizations	Key role in coordination and implementation. Specifically, UNHCR and IOM.

## The Role of the International Community: Short and Long-term Perspectives

In many cases, the role of international organizations is not only to provide adequate immediate response, but also to seek to strengthen the state capacity to do so in the process. In countries with stronger state capacities such as Colombia, these actors play a more auxiliary role and integrate themselves into existing institutions and structures while providing funding and technical support. In Liberia and Nigeria, international organizations and INGOs have played a more central role.

A central challenge facing these organizations is the balance between immediate humanitarian needs and sustainable response management that takes into account the long tail of needs and demands that stem from an FDP crisis in the long run. For example, short attention spans from donors and a narrow focus on the immediate humanitarian needs can lead to funding shortages before reintegration processes are completed. The World Bank found that attention to displacement and reintegration dissipates from donor country strategies after two to three funding cycles (Harild, Christensen & Zetter 2015). This was also confirmed in our field visits. In Liberia, despite the civil war ending in 2003, a large number of refugees returned in 2008 and 2009 and a small number of refugees are still returning in 2018. However, most donor funding for repatriation and reintegration ended even before 2008 and there is little support available for these returnees. Sustainability is often highlighted as an important and nominal objective in humanitarian programming, though tangible steps for achieving it are context-specific and not as often provided.

A similar scenario was found during our interviews in northeast Nigeria. Several interviewees, especially among the international community actors present in the field, emphasized the

importance of bridging the gap between short-term, immediate, humanitarian concerns, and long-term stabilization and development efforts in this region.<sup>5</sup> However, local actors noted that the ability to take a long-term view, as well as strengthening the State's capacity to face the long tail of returns and stabilization, remain major weaknesses in the modus operandi of the international community.

In all three case studies, actors pointed to the importance of directing efforts towards strengthening the states that will ultimately have to deal with the long-term demands of FDP programs, as well as revising the very short-term financial cycles of the international community.

### Findings and Implications

In terms of advocacy material to present to governments to shape FDP policies, this section provides relevant insights related to the degree of centralization of FDP response by the respective states. In determining the most appropriate degree of centralization, it is important to consider the strength of local elites, the existing capacities of the national and sub-national government actors, and the historic relationships between each of these levels with the FDP communities.

- By reducing the number of actors involved and potential coordination problems, a centralized approach may streamline both decision-making and delivery of services in contexts where there are already important frictions between state institutions at the national or sub-national level.
- When conflict and displacement have disrupted the sub-national level service provision, or when it has been low to begin with, centralization can increase speed of service delivery in emergencies as well as increasing the ability to bring in specialized and technical capacities of government personnel.

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<sup>5</sup> Indeed, bridging this gap is the goal of the Humanitarian Development Nexus strategy, advocated by the U.N. system and several other international actors (OCHA, 2018).

- Greater decentralization can lead to an increased level of policy ownership by local government implementers and to higher inclusion of local communities and FDPs. However, it may also lead to policy capture by entrenched local elites to the detriment of the local communities and FDPs. A decentralized approach may not be advisable in contexts where strong local elites have had historic frictions with the FDP populations.
- When conflict has had highly differentiated causes or effects across sub-national units, a more decentralized approach might be warranted. Decentralization can help to tailor responses to specific contexts, allowing to address the differentiated social, political, or economic dynamics across the different sub-units.
- In states where there are disparities in the skills of public officials between the national and sub-national units, centralization can also potentially increase the degree of specialization and technical capacities of the personnel. However, designating technocrats from the center to implement the policy often results in having implementers that do not know the context of the sub-region and enjoy limited levels of legitimacy and representativeness.

The degree of centralization of the national authority, the role of the international community, and the formal inclusion of the FDPs themselves influence the approach and outcomes. Following the analysis of institutional structure, this section provides implications for programming strategy by international actors and highlights potential tensions of adopting certain response approaches by the international community.

- Formal inclusion of FDPs in the decision-making structure can improve the programmatic response to displacement. Formal inclusion requires political will, however, as well as the capacity to both implement and enforce FDP inclusion. In cases where either the political will or the capacity is

lacking, promising inclusion and failing to live up to it can foster further conflicts.

- The role of the international community will vary based on the capacity of the national government and local CSOs. Given the long timeframe of FDP returns, international organizations, including those who work on humanitarian service provision, should seek to work with and/or through domestic partners, trying to increase the capacities of the national and sub-national actors to carry on reintegration well after their departure. This is especially important when international organizations take a central role in response implementation; it empowers programs to continue once the international actors leave.
- International actors should inform their programming decisions and delivery based on the existing institutional framework of the country where they are intervening. The (de)centralization analytical framework can be one step in this direction. It can be used to choose the level of government where partnerships have the most potential for success, as well as for identifying the areas where government has a comparative advantage (or not) in programming vis-à-vis the international community.
- Given the inevitable long tail of return, international organizations working in the crisis period should use initial increases in funding to invest in preparing local institutions – from local community organizations to the national government – to support returns in the long-term.
- As outlined in the final section on data, a move to collect data not only on returnees, but on the communities to which they travel would be valuable to programming efforts.

## 2.2 Relationship with Communities and Civil Society

### 2.2.1 Community Cohesion

Community cohesion refers to the way people trust and interact with each other under a common sense of purpose (De Berry 2018).<sup>6</sup> Studies of community cohesion are largely based on the principle that societies are divided into groups and that these groups shape our identities through boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Cooley & Payne 2017). One approach to studying conflict and prejudice between groups is the intergroup threat theory, which examines how group members perceive other groups that could cause them harm (Stephan & Stephan 2017). This notion of a real or symbolic threat is detrimental to interactions between groups.

Given that community cohesion is a strong predictor of cooperation and collective action, its promotion often constitutes a key goal of policies that support the return or integration of FDPs. For the post-conflict reconstruction to be successful, cooperation and collective action are crucial to determining opportunities to jointly negotiate and demand social and economic rights (e.g., infrastructure, aid, reparations, and private investment).<sup>7</sup> Yet in post-conflict settings, intergroup mistrust tends to impede cooperation and collective action (Luchetta 2015).

According to a recent World Bank review, issues of return and repatriation are largely missing from the literature and field research. This lack of information on the dynamics between the returnee

populations and receiving communities weakens the ability to devise inclusive interventions in return programming (De Berry & Roberts 2018).

In our three case studies, our field interviews highlighted the critical role that land disputes, differentiated access to services, and conflict resolution mechanisms play in promoting or hindering community cohesion. Below, is a list of common challenges in post-conflict contexts and examples of successful programming used to improve community cohesion:

#### a. Land/property ownership disputes

Land and property disputes are not only common drivers of conflict itself, but even after conflict, they remain among the most salient issues. Returnees often find their property occupied by new tenants, be they ex-combatants (as was the case in Ganta, Liberia) or people who were themselves displaced (as was often the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, described below). Insufficient record-keeping further complicates resolution of disputes and invites fraudulent property claims. For example, approximately 50 percent of land is claimed by an official title in Colombia, further complicating the post-conflict reintegration of returning FDP.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this report, our use of the term “community cohesion” refers both to the nature of relations between communities who remained during conflict and communities who were displaced and returned, but also to relationships between different members or groups within the displaced and returned community itself.

<sup>7</sup> We draw on Tyler (2010) for theories of cooperation, and Ostrom & Ahn (2008) for theories of collective action.

<sup>8</sup> According to data of the National University of Colombia, the land registry in Colombia has data that is not updated for 37% of properties and is lacking information on 26% of the land properties in the country (Agencia de Noticias Universidad Nacional, 2017). In addition to this, scholars from Universidad de los Andes have found that 47% of owners or possessors in the country do not have formal deeds or titles to their lands (Gáfaró, Ibañez, & Zarruk, 2012).

## Land Dispute Resolution Mechanisms The Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

While the BiH was not one of our core case studies, its experience with post-war resolution of land and property disputes is particularly instructive for our work. By the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995, some 2 million people, nearly half of the total population, were displaced internally or abroad. Reflecting this challenge, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) stipulated the establishment of the Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC) which was tasked with facilitating and overseeing the property restoration process.

Though recognized for its innovative and rights-oriented design, CRPC's proceedings were marred by many problems. The CRPC was not given sufficient institutional or financial support from the international community to handle the massive number of applications, which bottle-necked the restitution process. Further, the DPA did not provide the CRPC with an effective enforcement mechanism; non-compliance by local authorities and politicians was common and unpunished. Finally, the preeminent focus on property restitution as a form of reparation took attention away from the many other ways in which civilians suffered during the Bosnian War. As Williams (2006) observed: "[R]estitution can be an important mechanism in achieving both durable solutions and reparations, but that on its own it is adequate to neither."

### b. Stigmatization

In our three case studies, we found that stigmatization manifested itself differently than we had anticipated. In contrast to our original expectations, we found little stigmatization between those who stayed throughout the conflict or those who were displaced and returned in our field research trips. In Liberia, we were told this is

due in part to a shared sense among citizens that everyone was an FDP at some point during the conflict. In Colombia, interviewees indicated an absence of social stigma associated with formally registering as a victim.

Instead, stigmatization of former combatants and militants was identified as a key challenge in all three country cases. In Nigeria, community perceptions of ex-combatants, militants, or former members of Boko Haram range from apprehensive and mistrustful to fearful and hateful. Stigma of persons who perpetrated violence during conflict is further complicated when it is difficult to determine whether individuals joined an armed group willingly or were recruited forcibly, as is often the case in present-day Nigeria. In Colombia, apprehension against former FARC members has also been an issue in the reintegration efforts. In one of our interviews, a person close to the process reported that in several occasions complaints had been raised because health service providers discriminated against patients once they found out the patients were former FARC members (Personal Interview, October 2018, Colombia).

The topic of disarmament, reintegration, and rehabilitation of ex-combatants was raised by many of our interviewees. However, this topic is outside the scope of our research and, as our interviews did not specifically focus on ex-combatants, this report does not discuss any findings in this area.

### c. Differential access to services and aid

Preferential access to services or other forms of assistance for returnees compared to those who remained can foster and/or exacerbate tensions between these two groups. For example, in Colombia, once an individual is officially registered with the government as a victim, they have access to specific resources and institutions. Within the same communities there are other individuals who do not meet the formal government criteria for victim designation and thus do not receive these resources. This differential access to resources for victims compared to non-victims was a frequently cited tension within communities.

## Reducing tension in Liberia

### The 75/25 Approach

In Liberia, one strategy devised to defuse community tensions was to institutionalize a resource sharing structure between new returnees and the existing community. For returnee shelter construction, 75 percent of the housing units were allocated to returnees while 25 percent were reserved for either for the most vulnerable non-returnee members of the community or could be allocated for a communal community structure. While not completely equal, similar resettlement efforts could mitigate potential conflict by creating systems and processes that mandate balance for access to resources or services.

### 2.2.2. Informed Decision and Expectation Management

The right of FDPs to make informed and voluntary decisions as to whether they return or not to their places of origin is one of the crucial components of UNHCR's Guiding Principles (1996). There are three main conditions for a successful return: safety, nondiscrimination, and reintegration support. Governments often determine when situations are too unsafe to return and should generally strive to facilitate and aid the decisions of FDPs (UNHCR 2007). The UNHCR blueprints the ideal process for voluntary return decisions as follows:

- Provide information to FDPs that is accessible, objective, and comprehensive
- Consult with FDPs about available options
- Ensure participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups
- Ensure risk reduction and safety measures are taken
- Provide access to monitoring and humanitarian assistance

Within this framework, the foremost aspect of return is to ensure that it is informed. It is important for FDPs to have as much information as possible on the economic, social and safety

conditions in their areas of origin before returning. FDPs often have different levels of access to formal and informal channels of information when gathering data on the feasibility of return. Once a basis of adequate information is established, decisions should be voluntary, free and of full ownership by FDPs.

Formal channels of information are usually organized by domestic or international organizations leading the refugee response. One of the most popular tools are "Go and See" visits. These short trips allow representatives of displaced communities to inspect their areas of origin and form a first-hand opinion on the feasibility of return. In other instances, "Come and Tell" visits are organized instead in which individuals living in the place of origin will visit FDPs where they are displaced and provide information on the situation back home.

Informal channels of information are also important and were highlighted by several actors during our field visits. One form of informal channels is through communication between FDPs and those that remained in the places of origin (often family members or friends) that keep them updated about the situation on the ground. Another way to get information is through informal go and see visits that occur when the community leaders or other FDPs have the capacity to organize visits themselves before bringing their families or alerting the rest of the FDP community. In the case of Nigeria, Liberia, and Colombia, return decisions often relied on informal channels. Members of the El Salado community in Colombia (all of whom were collectively displaced) independently organized Go and See visits prior to the community's collective return. They used the opportunity to assess the security situation, clean up the town, and thus prepare for collective return. El Salado is considered by many to be a Colombian example of successful return. These informal Go and See efforts were not organized or supported by any Colombian or international organizations, although the Victims Unit later joined in collaboration with these organizations.

*"We were sectorized in different places, but people were dying of hunger, of overcrowding, of loneliness, of sadness. Then, seeing that each time we were less, we decided to return voluntarily. Then one day it was decided to make a fund like this among all of us and we decided to come here to see and clean up, ourselves the town after two years. (...) That's how it started."*

(Personal Interview with community leaders of El Salado, November 2, 2018, Colombia)

In Liberia, some refugees felt that their decisions were not well informed. Tyrone Marshall, head of the Liberia Returnee Network, complained that the picture that UNHCR and refugee camp leadership drew of the situation in Liberia was inaccurate and that the returnees' expectations were often not met. For example, FDPs were shown pictures of gas stations in Monrovia in order to signal economic and infrastructure development that were not representative of the conditions in the rest of the country. This led to disillusionment and disappointment on the part of the returnees that is notably long-standing (Personal Interview with Tyrone Marshall, October 2018, Liberia).

In Nigeria, during focus group discussions conducted in the Dalori 2 and Teachers' Village camps in Maiduguri, IDPs informed us that they currently get most information about the situation in their areas of origin from friends and relatives that have travelled back and forth, often ad-hoc. They stated that they would like more concrete and timely information from the government (IDP Focus Group Interviews, October 31, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

Nigeria staff working for INGOs confirmed that while informal networks can be useful for some forms of information, transfer of inaccurate or false information is a risk and these informal avenues must be complemented by official information channels (Personal Interviews, November 2, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

There is clear potential for engagement between the government, international organizations, and community leaders in order to provide more accurate information to FDPs. However, INGO staff stated that official channels were not in place, and that IDPs were receiving little accurate information about the security situation in areas of return (Personal Interviews, November 2, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). The views conveyed to us by several stakeholders also indicated there were no concrete plans in place for government-led Go and See visits.

IDPs informed us (IDP Focus Group Interviews, October 31, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria) that the information most important to them to make informed decisions about whether to return to their home communities were:

1. The security situation
2. Access to housing or shelters
3. Availability of livelihoods activities, in particular access to farmlands

The country director of a prominent humanitarian INGO shared his view that more official consultation was needed with different demographic groups of IDPs in order for the government to understand in detail exactly what kinds of information people would want to make informed decisions, and how they would want that information delivered (Personal Interview, October 29, 2018, Abuja, Nigeria).



## Expectation and Timelines

Managing expectations and setting clear timelines can prevent unrealistic expectations, grievances, and frustration that may contribute to reduced trust in public or international institutions. Moreover, often times, return areas lacked basic government services prior to any conflict and already struggled with providing basic rights. These may have been exacerbated by conflict, and a central challenge for policy and programming is balance between setting fair expectations and realistic goals regarding return.

In Nigeria, the government incentivized returns in Spring 2018 across the country, in particular to the town of Bama, which the government viewed as a “flagship” town for recovery and reconstruction. Prior to the crisis, Bama was an important business hub and a home to more than 250,000 people (Refugees International 2018). Bama’s population largely fled when Boko Haram took power in 2013. Nigerian forces then successfully recaptured Bama in 2015. Humanitarian actors informed us that the Nigerian government had vested interest in using returns in order to demonstrate that land recaptured from Boko Haram was now safe for return (Personal Interview, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

One major concern highlighted by humanitarian stakeholders was that during the period of government-incentivized returns (including to Bama), many IDPs were returned to their local government area (LGA), but not to their actual village of origin, often without their prior knowledge or consent. As a result, this should not be considered a return, but rather a secondary displacement.

State government officials informed us of lapses in coordination during this period of incentivized returns (Personal Interview, November 1, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). The government has since pulled back from actively encouraging returns and concluded that agreed minimum conditions must now be in place before returns can happen. These conditions have been recently formalized in the Borno State Return Strategy, which was co-published by the Borno State Government and the United Nations in September 2018 (Borno State Government & United Nations, 2018).

### ***Findings and Implications for Community Cohesion, Informed Decision and Expectation Management, and Expectations and timelines***

- Land ownership, stigma, differential access to services and ethnic grievances can be sources of continued tension, mistrust and prejudice within communities. Interventions that aim to increase community cohesion must identify the sources of tension in order to develop an intervention accordingly. Social capital and level of trust in a community are vital to achieve cooperation and collective action, which in turn lead to positive and durable returns.
- Information provided to potential FDP returnees should strive to accurately describe current conditions on the ground in places of origin so that FDPs can make a truly well-informed decision on their return.
- National governments and international actors need to set and clearly communicate realistic programming timelines to ensure that FDP’s expectations will be met. Recognizing that accurate information is difficult to obtain, the adverse long-term implications of overpromising highlight the importance of governments and international actors resisting the temptation to do so.
- If logistical, capacity and budgetary constraints prevented service provision in return areas before the conflict, contexts of return and post-conflict present both an opportunity to expand delivery of services and citizen rights, as well as a threat to generate greater grievances if expectations are not met.

# 3 Data Collection and Use

## The Importance of Data Collection and the Need for More Informed Decision-Making in FDP Return Efforts

Reliable and timely information enables FDPs, government, humanitarian and other key actors to make informed decisions and to plan effective responses to crises. To help coordinate information management, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has established principles that include checking the reliability and verifiability of data, making it accessible, distributing and sharing it with partners or the public, and promoting the humanitarian principals of inclusiveness, accountability, impartiality, humanity, reciprocity, and confidentiality.

Despite these principles, many coordination and usage challenges remain due to the extensive range of data sources as well as difficulties in access, resources, rapidly evolving population movements, and local politics. Even with accessible and relevant data, there is often a disconnect between data and its use in decision-making and programming. Decisions need to be made in the first days of an emergency, and “if the elements to effectively gather, manage and analyze data are not in place before a crisis, then the evidence needed to inform response will not be available quickly enough to matter” (Raymond, 2016). In these contexts, iterative data that is collected more frequently and that provides detailed local (rather than aggregated) information can be of more use for policymakers and implementers.

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### Tailoring the IOM’s DTM For Decision-making and Programming in Areas of Return

IOM’s DTM in Nigeria<sup>9</sup> is a crucial source of information for all humanitarian response actors including INGOs, the Nigerian government, and UN agencies.

In general, the DTM is a system used to:

1. Track and monitor displacement and population mobility
2. Provide critical information to decision-makers and responders during crises
3. Contribute to better understandings of population flows

DTM is used across various stages of a humanitarian response – most commonly during the emergency phase – to inform assistance to

displaced people. The DTM is a primary data source which includes four standard components: mobility tracking, flow monitoring, registration, and surveys. It is important to point out that DTM might be underestimating the actual figures. Ongoing conflict in Nigeria makes access to certain remote areas extremely difficult, leading to potential underestimates in new displacement and stock figures.

IOM is in the process of developing a methodology for expansion of its DTM system in northeast Nigeria to focus on areas of return and to be able to differentiate between a return that is durable and a return that is just another displacement. To this end, IOM is aiming to begin piloting village assessment surveys in areas of return by either late 2018 or early 2019. Village assessment surveys will include two core data collection methods: infrastructure mapping and household surveys.

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<sup>9</sup> The DTM is a joint initiative between IOM and NEMA, through is primarily managed and maintained by IOM.

IOM has requested that we provide recommendations on data indicators that could be collected through this process and which are linked to the eight durable solutions criteria mentioned in IASC's Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (Brookings 2015).

We have based our recommendations on information collected during our field visit to Nigeria, complemented by desk research. We have focused our recommendations on the IASC criteria that we were able to gather the most information on, rather than attempting to make broad recommendations across all eight criteria. Specific indicator recommendations are presented at the end of this section in Appendix I.

### **Key Contextual Findings on Potential Indicators, Achievement of Durable Solutions, and Programming in Areas of Return**

**Understanding the Pre-crisis Context:** Multiple humanitarian actors that we interviewed stressed that any thinking related to returns must take into full account the challenging context that existed across Borno State even before the current crisis. While debate remains around the root causes of conflict in Nigeria (Iyekekpolo 2018; Olofinbiyi and Steyn 2018), multiple interviews with INGO staff in Maiduguri emphasized how little government presence there was in many parts of the northeast prior to the crisis, and that government's neglect contributed to Boko Haram's rise. For example, INGO staff highlighted how few nurses and doctors there were across many local government areas (LGAs), as well the limitations with regards to resources that were devoted to education (Personal Interview, November 2, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). One recurrent theme throughout this section is the comparison between what constituted the status quo before the crisis versus what is an acceptable durable solution according to international norms.

**Information Disconnect:** Several interviewees relayed instances where in the past year emergency advocacy was conducted by both the diplomatic and INGO communities to highlight the reality of conditions on the ground in order to halt government-encouraged returns. The issue of political pressure to return has been widely raised, most notably by Refugees International in a March 2018 report (Refugees International 2018). The report states that political pressure for displaced populations to return has increased as returns have been portrayed in the public discourse as a key metric for success in the fight against Boko Haram and a "return to normalcy."

**Security, "Garrison Towns" and Durable Solutions:** Humanitarian actors that we interviewed were clear that the situation in northeast Nigeria is a protracted conflict with no end in sight. The Nigerian government's strategy to stabilize the northeast has involved recapturing and securing the capitals of LGAs across the region. Due to the continued presence of Boko Haram in surrounding areas, in general only these capitals have been secured, and they have been developed as "garrison towns" around which the military maintains security within a radius of some 2 to 10 kilometers.

With only a relatively small area of land secured, there is limited access to farmlands, economic activities, and services, which poses a challenge to recovery and development. Several UN and INGO interviewees suggested an alternative strategy: rather than securing LGA capitals located very far from each other, they proposed that the military focus on securing strategic hubs in close proximity, to create securely clustered areas where farming and trade could take place. However, the same interviewees also stated that the Nigerian government has continued to emphasize that resource constraints would make this strategy unworkable.

Even with increased security or military presence, humanitarian actors indicated to us that no amount of military presence could provide guaranteed safety from Boko Haram attacks. They believed this

would only be possible through some form of reconciliation or peace process. Interviews with IDP community leaders echoed these views. They indicated that it would take a large contingent of both military and police to establish security, but that even then attacks could not be prevented (IDP Focus Group Interview, October 3, 1 2018, Dalori 2 IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria). During focus group discussions, adult male IDPs informed us that they want the Nigerian military to assure their safety.

Several INGOs indicated that there had been very little police presence in rural areas prior to the crisis (Personal Interview, November 1, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). Nigerian federal government officials informed us of their desire to establish a community-policing initiative, suggesting that the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) should be at the heart of such an initiative (Personal Interview, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). The CJTF formed in 2013 to support Nigerian security forces and to protect local communities from Boko Haram attacks and has since grown to an estimated 26,000 members. The group has been engaged in security operations and more recently has been involved in providing security to IDP camps. Federal government interviewees cited the crucial role that the CJTF had played in combatting Boko Haram, especially through the provision of community-level intelligence to the military (Personal Interview, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). However, INGO interviewees stated that IDPs had raised serious gender violence complaints against the CJTF (Personal Interview, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

**The Power of Push:** Our focus group sessions with IDPs indicated that one specific push factor was having significant impact in encouraging IDPs to return. This push factor is related to the anguish that a large number of IDPs expressed to us about how living in camps for several years without access to livelihood generating activities had taken away their sense of independence and ability to provide for their families. This lack of independence was widely cited by IDPs as a reason for them either having made a previous

decision to return (which was followed by further displacement) or for them considering future return, despite being aware of the dangerous security conditions and lack of services (IDP Focus Group Interviews, October 31, 2018, Dalori 2 IDP Camp, Teachers' Village IDP Camp; Maiduguri, Nigeria).

**Access to Services and Adequate Standard of Living:** Nigerian federal government interviewees indicated that until basic accommodation and services could be provided, there should be no new discussion of encouraged-returns (Personal Interviews, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). They also indicated that they viewed functioning of a local market in areas of return as a good proxy indicator of some level of safety and security. Yet in most areas, accommodation, services, and markets are still lacking.

Humanitarian actors that we interviewed indicated that an absence of government-led LGA development plans would be a major challenge going forward. This was attributed to the lack of state-government capacity and it has resulted in a vacuum with regards to an overall strategy to guide localized recovery efforts. Another concern raised with us was the view that prioritization of recovery efforts was being primarily decided by the amount of funding available per sector and individual partners' priorities, as opposed to need (Personal Interview, October 30, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). A number of humanitarian actors suggested to us that development funding should immediately prioritize local government capacity building for planning and recovery.

Nigerian federal government officials and humanitarian actors indicated that a core issue for recovery of services would be the ability to persuade staff to return to LGA capitals. Teachers, doctors and nurses have all been purposely targeted by Boko Haram, and human resource capacity is a substantial challenge for recovery. Even prior to the crisis there was a lack of government presence and staff. INGO staff also expressed concern as to what they viewed as an absence of government planning to actually facilitate returns of teachers and civil

servants, citing a lack of security protections, accommodation, and guarantees regarding school rebuilding (Personal Interviews, November 2, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

The needs of children are especially important given that the majority of those that have been displaced by the conflict (around 60 percent) are under the age of 18 (UNDP & UNHCR 2017). In our focus group sessions, both adolescent male and adult male IDPs indicated their desire for more and better-quality schools in their areas of origin. Indeed, recent studies have found an almost unanimous consensus that the conflict has increased demand for education relative to pre-conflict levels (Coinco 2017). Because the conflict has displaced many children from rural communities to IDP camps in Maiduguri, many have been receiving some form of education, often for the very first time. For example, in the Muna Garage IDP Camp on the outskirts of Maiduguri, an estimated 90 per cent of students were enrolled in school for the first time (UNICEF 2017). Researchers have found that this experience resulted in parents recognizing the value of schooling, and even more strongly, children wanting to attend school when they returned to their communities (Coinco 2017).

While IDPs pointed out that there are often primary schools in rural areas of Borno State, they indicated concern around the absence of secondary schools in their areas of origin (IDP Focus Group Interview, October 31, 2018, Teachers' Village IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria). UNICEF and INGO organizations clarified that while many rural communities were in proximity to primary education prior to the crisis, access did not necessarily imply learning. Nigerian INGO staff that we interviewed believed that even prior to the crisis, the majority of rural schools were not properly functioning due to combination of a lack of qualified teachers and teacher absenteeism (Personal Interview, November 2, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). Given the challenges in providing education in areas of return, in particular due to lack of teachers, UNICEF was clear about the need

for innovative solutions, and they are now prioritising delivery of non-formal education within their programming (Personal Interview, November 1, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). This includes training community members as facilitators, distance learning through radio instruction, and exploring the possibility of remote lessons delivered by teachers located in Maiduguri.

**Access to Livelihoods:** Due to the limited secured perimeters of LGA capitals, there is currently extremely restricted access to farmland. Some returnees have made use of so-called commuter farms, but a UN official that we interviewed informed that those who stayed overnight at these farms have been attacked (Personal Interview, November 1, 2018, Maiduguri, Nigeria). During our focus group discussions, many adult male IDPs indicated that if they could return, they would like to go back to their work as farmers. However, they stated that because farming was highly seasonal, they desired training in other skills in order to be able to provide for their families during the dry season. As opposed to farming, many adolescent male IDPs indicated a preference for work as traders, tailors, in transportation, carpentry or in the military (IDP Focus Group Interviews, October 31 2018, Dalori 2 IDP Camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria).

**Community Cohesion:** We asked adult male IDPs if they had concerns about community-related tensions that might arise if they did return home, but the only responses indicated a confidence that they would be welcomed back (IDP Focus Group Interviews, October 31, 2018, Dalori 2 IDP camp, Maiduguri, Nigeria). Several humanitarian interviewees expressed concern over the potential for future property disputes, since many of the first IDPs to return to towns such as Bama could access only a small amount of farmland or property within the secure perimeter, which did not necessarily belong to them. Additionally, INGO interviewees informed us that in Bama, there are now services being provided in the IDP camp located there, but not in the wider community, where there is also great need. There was concern that this disparity could lead to tensions.

## IOM Nigeria's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)

### Sources of Data

In the context of returns, IOM Nigeria's DTM currently relies on two data collection activities or tools.:

1. Enumerators who visit multiple field sites periodically to collect information through:
  - Key Informant Interviews;
  - Direct Observation; and
  - Focus Groups.
2. Biometric Registration: A one-time registration of a household with the potential for an extended survey.

With the pilot of the Village Assessment Survey, detailed information can be collected on access to basic services, infrastructure and other key indicators essential for ensuring that reintegration programs are developed and implemented on a foundation of accurate information. Thus, two new sources of data that might be potentially available are:

3. Physical Mapping and Verification of Services
4. Surveys of a Representative Sample of Households

Building on this, we look to existing datasets that might complement the information collected by DTM, forming our final element:

5. External Data Sources (ACLED, WFP, WHO)

Based on these data sources, as well as indicators proposed through IASC's Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, the table to follow presents a collection of proposed indicators that aim to reflect whether or not a location would foster a durable return. The main goal of these indicators is to build on the DTM's existing structure to be able to understand:

- Where people have moved to;
- How people are returning;
- How to ensure that where people return amounts to a durable solution; and
- Which indicators are most strongly linked to people staying? I.e., what are the indicators that are most correlated with durable returns?

We have organized the main table by IASC theme, and included columns for the indicator of interest, the data collection methods, feasibility of data collection, what indicates a positive or negative

trend, whether the indicator meets the SMART criteria and how the indicator should be weighted. While there are no set or accepted standards for selecting indicators, one popular guideline has been to use the acronym 'SMART': indicators should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable and action-oriented, Relevant, and Time-bound (BetterEvaluation.org 2018). We have used this method as a clear criterion to evaluate the quality of each indicator.

Throughout the table, we use a Green, Yellow, and Red, "stoplight" system to evaluate the extent to which each indicator is specific and clear, measurable or easy to quantify, attainable, relevant and captures the underlying theme, and able to be tracked in the short and long term. Having reviewed each indicator using the SMART criteria and the stoplight system, we highlight "priority indicators" in the next section, which we propose could be used to construct an index or set of minimum criteria.

# Priority Indicators, By IASC Indicator Themes

The goal of this priority list to to highlight the most important IDP perceptions around access to services compared to the non displaced population.

*(Where required, definitions/calculations have been included in bullets)*

## 1. Safety and Security

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Government indicator for classification of military deployed (High, Med, Low)

Traditional leader has returned to place of origin (Y/N) (3 tiers)

Daily Public Life (Streets are sparsely populated with people leaving home only when needed, busy but tense, stable/business as usual)

% of returnee HH that perceive safe road access: Into village (Y/N), Out of village (Y/N), During the Day (Impossible, Difficult, Feasible), At Night (Impossible, Difficult, Feasible) (Disaggregated by sex)

% of returnee population who feel safe walking around the areas they live in "Do you feel safe building a life here?"

% of returnee population who feel safe: Collecting food, Collecting water, Going to the farm

% of returnee population willing to turn to the police/authorities in case of need

## 2. Access to Basic Services

---

Food and Nutrition Estimated number of HH w/ at least one (IDPs, returnees, residents - all) who is/are malnourished

Access to Food (No immediate access, On site, Off site)

% of the HH depending on the humanitarian food supplies

Shelter % of HH living in public or private rental, collective arrangements, lease

% of HH living in emergency or transitional housing or informal settlements

% of HH living with no shelter

Water % of HH with access to clean drinking water sources

Sanitation % of HH with access to basic sanitation facility (This refers to sanitation facilities that are designed to hygienically separate excreta from human contact, contain a handwashing facility with soap and water on premises, and are not shared with other households)

NFI % of HH depending on the humanitarian supplies for Non-food Items

Education Functioning Schools as a ratio of schools in village

- # of functioning schools/  
(# of functioning schools + # of non-functioning schools)

Ratio of school age children of returnees participating in educational program compared to those of residents (disaggregated by sex)

- % of returnee boys being educated/ % of resident boys being educated

- % of returnee girls being educated/ % of resident girls being educated

Health # of functioning PHCC/

(# of functioning PHCC + # of non-functioning PHCC)

### 3. Livelihoods

---

% of HH with 75% of income from sustainable income sources over the last 30 days

- Unsustainable income sources could include: donations, aid, loans, asset sales, etc.

% of HH with no source of income

% of returnee farmers with ability to access farm land

- Question for Returnee "If you are still a farmer, can you access farmland?"

% of returnee fishermen with the ability to access lake/river

- Question for Returnee "If you are still a fisherman, can you access fishing points?"

% of HH with access to sources of credit

% of HH regularly visiting the market

- "How often do you or someone from your family visit the market?" (Never, Rarely, Frequently, Everyday)

### 4. Housing Land and Property

---

Existence of dispute resolution process in the case of HLP disputes (Y/N)

### 5. Documentation

---

Mechanism to acquire ID available (& functioning) (Y/N)

### 6. Participation

---

Ratio of returnees who actively participated in community, social, or political organizations in the last 12 months compared to resident population among those interested (disaggregated by sex)

- $(\# \text{ active returnee men} / \# \text{ total returnee men}) / (\# \text{ active resident men} / \# \text{ total resident men})$
- $(\# \text{ active returnee women} / \# \text{ total returnee women}) / (\# \text{ active resident women} / \# \text{ total resident women})$

% of adult returnees eligible and registered to vote in comparison to the resident population (disaggregated by sex)

- $(\# \text{ eligible returnee men} / \# \text{ total returnee men}) / (\# \text{ eligible resident men} / \# \text{ total resident men})$
- $(\# \text{ eligible returnee women} / \# \text{ total returnee women}) / (\# \text{ eligible resident women} / \# \text{ total resident women})$

### 7. Justice

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Perception of fair local justice system (0-5 scale) (disaggregated by sex)

- Average score for male respondents
- Average score for female respondents

### 8. Community Cohesion

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% of returnee HH that believe that they can influence in local affairs, currently and in location of potential return compared to resident population

% of returnee HH that perceive some tension between groups/communities in their village



# Appendix I: DTM

## Indicator Framework | SMART<sup>10</sup>

SMART	Definition for this project	Green	Yellow	Red
Specific	Indicator measures something clear, is not too broad a concept	Clear and uniform measurement likely	Clear, but variability in definitions likely	Variability too high to make meaningful
Measurable & Mappable	Data is quantifiable i.e. it has the capacity to be counted, observed, analyzed, tested, or challenged. This is true at multiple levels.	Data is measurable and easy to analyze at all levels	Data is measurable, but less meaningful across all levels	Data is difficult to quantify and not meaningful at all levels
Attainable <sup>11</sup>	Data is available, or attainable through planned mechanisms at reasonable cost	Data already available or measurable through minor change to existing data capture	Data available through KI interviews and physical mapping	Data available only through high cost, or large survey mechanism
Relevant	Indicator measures something meaningful to the project/assessment at hand	Outcome that reflects the essence of durable returns	Output that reflects the essence as a contribution to the outcome	Indicator does not capture the essence of what was intended
Trackable	Indicator will show desirable change in the short-term and the long-term and can be mapped	Indicator is differentiated between villages in ST and LT	Indicator is meaningful in either ST or LT but not both, or some but not much variability between villages or is a binary measurement.	Indicator is too ambiguous to identify positive trends

<sup>10</sup> With the exception of "T" currently all proposed indicators are yellow and green, those that were red were eliminated from the list prior to this proposal.

<sup>11</sup> Through interviews and examining the data sources available on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (<https://data.humdata.org>), we identified several relevant datasets. However, with the exception of World Food Program's (WFP) mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM) Food Security Indicators, no other publicly available data set we encountered was disaggregated by state in Nigeria. For example, the mVAM database includes indicators on daily wages for manual labor, toilet access and type, and food access, all disaggregated by state. Other data sets have potentially useful security data (e.g., ACLED, or the SiND Aid Worker KKA (Killed, Kidnapped or Arrested) data), however they are aggregated at the country level.

# Safety and Security

Sub-theme	Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method <sup>1</sup>	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Security Infrastructure (Military, Police, Local Authorities)	Government indicator for classification of military deployed (High, Med, Low)	External Data Source	short-term increase, long-term decrease						x
	Adequate accommodation is available for security forces (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	ST increase in y; LT redundant						
	Presence of government protection services (such as police authorities)	Physical Mapping	Increase (may not have had gov't security presences previously, and may not correlate with real security)						
	Traditional leader has returned to place of origin (Y/N) (3 tiers)	Physical Mapping	increase in y (cited as a key indicator because IDPs cited often in interviews)						x
	Mechanisms to address violations by security personnel exist (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	increase in y (mechanisms may exist, but be unutilized or otherwise ineffective)						
	Mechanisms to address potential instances of GBV by security personnel exist (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	increase in y (mechanisms may exist, but be unutilized or otherwise ineffective)						
Security Infrastructure (Freedom of Movement)	HH Perceptions of Security (e.g., through surveys of daily public life: Streets are sparsely populated with people leaving home only when needed, busy but tense, stable/business as usual)	HH Survey; KI interviews	ST sparse to busy; LT stability						x
	Curfew was imposed in the village during assessment period (Y/N)	KI interviews	Decrease in Y						
	% of returnee HH that perceive safe road access: Into village (Y/N), Out of village (Y/N), During the Day (Impossible, Difficult, Feasible), At Night (Impossible, Difficult, Feasible) (Disaggregated by sex)	KI interviews	ST in and our priority; LT across all 4						x
	% of returnee population that visits inaccessible areas for any reason	HH Survey	ST Decrease; LT redundant						
Threats to Safety and Security	Mine action integrated survey of hazardous areas and explosive ordinance disposal has been completed (Y/N)	Physical Mapping/External Data Source (UNMAS)	Yes						
	# security incidents reported during current assessment	External Data Source (ACLEDA Data, currently used for Ward Index)	Decrease						x
Community Perceptions of Protection	% of returnee population who feel safe walking around the areas they live in "Do you feel safe building a life here?"	HH Survey	Increase						
	% of returnee population who feel safe: Collecting food, Collecting water, Going to the farm	HH Survey	Increase						x
	% of returnee population that believe in a risk of reprisal	HH Survey	Decrease						
	% of returnee population that feel comfortable talking to the Military	HH Survey	Increase						
	% of female population that perceiving moving for food, water as high risk for GBV	HH Survey	Decrease						
Reporting of Incidents	% of returnee population willing to turn to the police/authorities in case of need	HH Survey	increase						x

## Adequate Standard of Living (1/2)

Sub-theme	Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Food and Nutrition	Estimated number of HH w/ at least one (IDPs, returnees, residents - all) who is/are malnourished	External Data Source	decrease						X
	Access to Food (No immediate access, On site, Off site)	Physical Mapping	decrease of no access						X
	Percentage of sites with evidence of supplementary feeding for pregnant women, infants and the elderly (E.g., # of household dependent on unsustainable food sources: humanitarian food supplies or cash for this purpose)	Physical Mapping	increase ST, mixed long-term						
	% of the HH depending on the humanitarian food supplies	HH Survey, External Data Source	mixed indicator ST, decrease LT						X
	% of the HH purchasing the food commodities	HH Survey	mixed indicator ST, increase LT						
	% of the HH depending on cultivation	HH Survey	mixed indicator ST, increase LT						
	% of the HH receiving donations from residents	HH Survey	mixed indicator ST, decrease LT						
Shelter	% of HH living in public or private rental, collective arrangements, lease	HH Survey	increase						X
	% of HH living in emergency or transitional housing or informal settlements	HH Survey	mixed indicator ST, decrease LT						X
	% of HH living with no shelter	HH Survey	decrease						X
	% of HH secure in their current housing: Do you feel secure about your current housing/ do you fear having to move from your current housing?	HH Survey	Increase in y						
	% of HH living in insufficient living space (The number of members in the household need to be divided with the reported number of rooms. If there are more than three people occupying one room, the household is considered to have insufficient living space. This approach does not distinguish between children and adults.)	HH Survey	decrease						
WASH - Water	% of HH with access to clean drinking water sources	KI interviews	increase						X
	Average collection time of water is not more than 30 minutes for a roundtrip including queuing (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	increase						
	Average quantity of water available per person/day > 20 litres (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	Limit to be met; increase in % of people saying Y						
	Complaints about drinking water quality (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	decrease						
WASH - Sanitation	% of good toilets in the village	KI interviews	increase						
	% of Not so good toilets in the village	KI interviews	ST mixed; LT decrease						
	% of Unsuable toilets in the village	KI interviews	decrease (look at whether of all toilets, # unusable)						
	Prevalence of Open defecation (High, Med, Low, Absent)	KI interviews	High to Absent						X
	% of HH with access to basic sanitation facility (This refers to sanitation facilities that are designed to hygienically separate excreta from human contact, contain a handwashing facility with soap and water on premises, and are not shared with other households)	HH Survey	increase						X

## Adequate Standard of Living (2/2)

Sub-theme	Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
<b>Other commodities</b>	% of HH depending on the humanitarian supplies for Non-food Items	HH Survey	ST mixed; LT decrease						x
<b>Education</b>	# of functioning schools / (# of functioning schools + # of non-functioning schools)	Physical Mapping	increase						x
	Proximity to the schools (Easy, Requires Time, Difficult)	Physical Mapping	Towards easy						
	# of teachers available in the area	Physical Mapping	increase						
	% of teachers who originally did not reside in the village/ live in temporary accommodation	Physical Mapping	ST increase; LT decrease						
	Highest level of schooling available	Physical Mapping	Informative indicator						
	Average # of days per week participating children attended educational programme	HH Survey	increase						
	% of school age children of returnees participating in educational program compared to those of residents	HH Survey	Increase towards 1						x
<b>Health</b>	# of functioning PHCC/ (# of functioning PHCC + # of non-functioning PHCC)	Physical Mapping	increase						x
	% of PHCCs that are INGO-UN funded with INGO/Staff	Physical Mapping	increase ST, mixed long-term						
	% of PHCCs that are INGO-UN funded with government staff	Physical Mapping	increase						
	% of PHCCs that are government funded with government staff	Physical Mapping	increase ST, mixed long-term						
	% of births attended by skilled health personnel	HH Survey	increase						
	% of children under the age of one covered by all vaccines included in their national programme (disaggregated by sex)	HH Survey/ External Data Source	increase						
	% of PHCC that are older than 1 year (Proxy for Sustainability)	Physical Mapping	increase						

## Access to Livelihoods

Sub-theme	Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Access to Income	% of the HH w/ at least one individual that is employed in the public sector and paid regularly	HH Survey	Increase						
	% of the HH w/ at least one individual that is employed in the private sector and paid regularly	HH Survey	Increase						
	% of the HH w/ at least one individual that is self-employed	HH Survey	Increase						
	% of working age population that is unemployed	HH Survey	Decrease						
	% of HH with 75% of income from sustainable income sources over the last 30 days (i.e. Percentage of HH with economic self-sufficiency in current location) (Unsustainable income sources could include: donations, aid, loans, asset sales, etc.)	HH Survey	Increase						x
	% of HH with no source of income	Physical Mapping	Decrease						x
Access to Income Generation Activities (Access to productive assets, markets and financial services)	% of HH dependant on jobs/activities funded by international agencies	HH Survey	ST increase; LT decrease						
	% of returnee farmers with ability to access farm land (Question for Returnee "If you are still a farmer, can you access farmland?")	HH Survey	Increase						x
	% of returnee fishermen with the ability to access lake/river (Question for Returnee "If you are still a fisherman, can you access fishing points?")	HH Survey	Increase						x
	% of HH with access to sources of credit	HH Survey	Increase						x
	% of HH that own productive assets	HH Survey	Increase						
	Presence of secure checkpoints established between village and market (Y/N)	Physical Mapping	ST increase; LT decrease						
	Safe road access to nearest trading areas (percentage of bush cleared, times during which travel is recommended)	Physical Mapping	Increase						
	Consistency of market functioning (Y/N): % of HH regularly visiting the market: "How often do you or someone from your family visit the market?" (Never, Rarely, Frequently, Everyday)	HH Survey	Never to Everyday						x
Household Economy	% of HH that believe that there exists potential for commerce (Y/N): "If you had a product worth XXX, would you be able to sell it in your community?" (Y/N)	HH Survey	Increase in Y						
	% of HH with high earner/dependency ratio	HH Survey	Decrease						
	% of returnee HH who in the last assessment period was not able to pay for food expenses	HH Survey	Decrease						

## Restoration of Housing, Land and Property

Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Existence of mechanisms to determine legal status to housing and property (Y/N)	Physical Mapping / KI Interviews	Increase in Y						
Existence of dispute resolution process in the case of HLP disputes (Y/N)	Physical Mapping / KI Interviews	Increase in Y						x
Perception of returnees of transparent/fair housing procedures (0-5 scale)	HH Survey	Increase in 5						

## Access to Documentation

Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Mechanism to acquire ID available (& functioning) (Y/N)	HH Survey	Increase in Y, Y	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	X

## Participation in Public Affairs

Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
% of returnees who actively participated in community, social, or political organizations in the last 12 months compared to resident population among those interested (e.g., attended meetings or events, or were otherwise involved in the work of a group/organisation; Community, social or political organisations may include: youth organisations, women's organisations, environmental organisations, sports groups, pro-IDP advocacy groups, political parties and others)	HH Survey (disaggregated by sex)	Increase towards resident population rates	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	X
% of adult returnees eligible and registered to vote in comparison to the resident population	External Data Source (e.g., national voter roll, disaggregated by sex).	Increase towards resident population rates	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	X

## Access to Effective Remedies And Justice

Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
# of GBV cases receiving due process / # of GBV cases reported	Physical Mapping	Increase	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	
Perception of fair local justice system (1-5 scale) (disaggregated by sex, with a higher weighting for women - instead of a direct indicator for GBV because such a question is more likely to capture discomfort and can be revealing about inequality)	KI interviews, HH survey of IDPs	Increase in 5	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	X

## Community Cohesion

Indicator (Description and Computation)	Data Collection Method	Positive Trend & Notes on Interpretation	S	M	A	R	T	Priority
Eligibility of resident population for benefits akin to those available to IDP and Returnee Population (from 0 to 3, corresponding to none, less, equal, more)	External Data Source	increase in equal	Green	Yellow	Red	Green	Green	
% of returnee HH that believe that they can influence in local affairs, currently and in location of potential return compared to resident population	HH Survey	Increase	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	X
Community Leader believes there is tension in the village (Y/N)	KII		Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	
% of returnee HH that perceive some tension between groups	HH Survey	Decrease	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	X

# Appendix II: Methodology

## Field Research

The table and maps below summarize the locations where interviews and focus groups were conducted within each country.



Colombia: Bogotá; Puerto Asis, Putumayo ;Mocoa, Putumayo; Pita, Bolívar; El Salado, Bolívar  
Image Courtesy: Google Maps



Liberia: Monrovia, Ganta  
Image Courtesy: Google Maps



Nigeria: Abuja; Maiduguri  
Image Courtesy: Google Maps

In each country, students relied on clients (IOM and Mercy Corps), personal contacts, referrals from interviewees, and contact information found online to compile a list of interviewees. Special attention was paid to ensure a balanced representation of different types of actors in the key informant interviews and diversity of focus group participants. In all three countries, interviews were solicited from individuals representing national and local governments, international organizations, international NGOs, and local NGOs.

Interviews were generally one to two hours in length. In Colombia, interviews were conducted in English or Spanish and focus groups were conducted in Spanish, without the use of a translator as all students who participated in the fieldwork speak Spanish. We have translated the citations from Colombia that appear in the report to English. In Liberia, all interviews were conducted in English. In Nigeria, key informant interviews were conducted in English and focus groups were conducted in local languages with the use of translators provided by IOM.

Key informant interviews and focus groups were unscripted, but students drew from a list of prepared topics and questions, which were drafted based on the research questions proposed by Mercy Corps and IOM. Interview and focus group topics included:

- The organization's role
- Personal experiences/stories of FDPs
- Coordination with other actors/organizations
- Programs, policies, and services for FDPs – provided by government, international organizations, and NGOs
- Push and pull factors affecting the return of FDPs
- Challenges around community cohesion – specifically tensions between returnees and group
- Factors affecting stigmatization of individuals or groups
- Programming and policies to enhance community cohesion
- Factors that support social cohesion
- Disputes and dispute resolution mechanisms
- Data collection and use – what data is available, what is not available, what would be useful, what are the constraints
- Sustainability of return programs



Marketplace, Maiduguri, Nigeria  
Photo By: Luke Strathmann



## Key Informant Interviews

The table below summarizes the number of key informant interviews conducted with different types of actors in each country. For many key informant interviews, multiple individuals from the same organization were interviewed together. Where this is the case, such interviews are counted as one interview. Thus, the table below reflects the number of distinct interviews conducted, but not necessarily the number of individuals interviewed. A complete list of the organizations that these actors are affiliated to is provided at the end of this section. However, it is important to note that in many occasions the interviewees were speaking as individuals and not reflecting the official position of the organization they are affiliated with. One-on-one interviews with IDPs conducted in Colombia are also included in the table below.

Country	National Gov.	Local Gov.	Multilateral Organization	INGO	Local NGO	Indiv. IDP
Colombia	3	3	3	3	1	8
Liberia	5	1	2	6	3	-
Nigeria	2	2	5	4	-	-

## Focus Groups

Focus groups with current and former IDPs were also conducted in Colombia and Nigeria. While focus groups with IDPs were not conducted in Liberia, most key informant interviewees in Liberia were formerly IDPs themselves, and many of them volunteered their personal stories and experiences during the interviews. The research teams took notes during all interviews and focus groups complemented by audio recordings when interviewee consent was given.

The table below provides detailed information on the focus groups held in Nigeria and Colombia and the approximate number of participants in each focus group. The focus group in Paraíso Community, Colombia was conducted as a town hall meeting rather than a focus group due to the large size. In Nigeria, separate focus groups were conducted with women, youth, and community leaders.

Country	Location / Community	Number of Participants
Colombia	Londres Community	5
Colombia	Villa Rosa Community	22
Colombia	Paraíso Community	35
Nigeria	Dalori II IDP Camp – Community Leaders	15-20
Nigeria	Dalori II IDP Camp – Women	15-20
Nigeria	Dalori II IDP Camp – Youth	15-20
Nigeria	Teachers Village IDP Camp – Community Leaders (Men)	10
Nigeria	Teachers Village IDP Camp – Women	15

# List of Key Informant Interviewees

## Colombia

Ministry of Health  
 Victim's Unit – National and Municipal level  
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)  
 World Food Program (WFP)  
 USAID - Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)  
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)  
 Mercy Corps  
 Women's Alliance of Putumayo  
 University of Rosario  
 Office of the Inspector General of Colombia  
 Fundación Semana

## Liberia

Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) – National and County level  
 Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection  
 Ministry of Health  
 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-information Services (LISGIS)  
 International Organization for Migration (IOM)  
 International Rescue Committee (IRC)  
 The Kaizen Company  
 Search for Common Ground  
 United States Embassy  
 Special Emergency Activity to Restore Children's Hope (SEARCH)  
 Think Liberia  
 Liberia Returnee Network

## Nigeria

National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)  
 Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI)  
 Borno State Ministry for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR)  
 Borno State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)  
 International Organization for Migration (IOM)  
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)  
 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)  
 United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS)  
 International Rescue Committee (IRC)  
 INGO Forum  
 Plan International  
 Action Against Hunger (ACF)

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